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Abstract 
Governments are major players in promoting green developments, with private finance being an ideal environment in which 
such promotion can take place. The financial collaboration between governments and the private sector through public private 
partnerships (PPP) can promote a widespread implementation of green initiatives. Two reasons make this possible. First, in 
order to respond to the growing green awareness, governments have a great leverage on how green investments can be 
developed by the private party while enjoying steady revenues and good services for the public. Second, the international 
community is promoting green growth in developing countries through PPP investments, and so PPP can play a major role in 
widespread green growth. 
This study focuses on improving the chances of success with PPP contracts, since more successful projects will lead to 
improved welfare and will improve the chances for greening the community.  
The methodology for this report was a literature review of peer-reviewed journals that analysed the design of PPP contracts and 
the role of simulative approaches in investment appraisals to recommend improvements for PPP contracts. 
The study concluded with two recommendations to improve the success of PPP; the first one was to reconsider the design of 
PPP contracts to include a hybrid structure that allows for a put and call options with a very controlled renegotiation clause. The 
second was to improve the risk simulation approach to improve the investment appraisal process through improving the type 
and quality of input variables, in addition to the creation of cost and events charters of all completed projects. 
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1. Introduction 
To sustain economic growth while reducing greenhouse emission levels requires a large-scale transition. The 
collaboration between governments, businesses and investors can provide an ideal long-term solution for such a 
transition. Governments are key players in stimulating green growth, with private finance being one of the most 
effective tools in making it happen (Merk et al., 2012; 3GF, 2012). 
The financial collaboration between governments and the private sector through public private partnerships 
(PPP) can promote a widespread implementation of green initiatives. PPP are “any initiative which is funded and 
operated through an alliance between public institutions and private actors” (3GF, 2012). This financial instrument 
is widely used to fund large projects, especially infrastructure projects. The type of PPP that are connected to green 
growth are defined as “the activities of public and private actors that enable an accelerated transition to a green 
economy, with a particular focus on achieving speed to scale across borders” (3GF, 2012). 
The main aim of PPP is to enhance the effectiveness of development projects while providing funding for the 
same. If sustainable development in terms of economy has to be achieved, and the climate resilience has to be 
strengthened, then PPP together with the private sector can make notable contributions (NRCS, 2011). The roles 
being played by the private sector in this regard are becoming even more prominent and important. As such, the 
international communities have deployed several plans in order to encourage participation of the private sector 
within the PPP green developments. In order to benefit from this international facility, governments must adopt 
green strategies to attract these funds for developing much-needed public projects, which will lead to a widespread 
implementation of green developments (3GF, 2012). Also, the PPP mitigates associated business risks because it 
promotes joint development activities, which cater to both the public and private sectors. As such, large green 
projects can be implemented that neither the public nor the private sector can achieve on their own because of their 
limited financing or technological options.  
The successful utilization of PPP contracts around the globe, especially in countries such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, has set the example for developing countries to follow in procuring governmental 
projects. The proven advantages, such as risk transfer and the availability of private funds, are encouraging less 
privileged countries to seek international PPP contracts.  
PPP contracts have become well-established instruments for procuring governmental projects. These contracts 
incorporate risk sharing, efficiency, quality, innovation, experience, and private sector funds. In order for PPP to 
deliver their benefits expected, the criteria for their success must be satisfied. It is imperative to highlight and 
investigate the challenges facing the implementation of PPP, to improve their outcomes and enable governments to 
sustain their green initiatives. 
This report focuses on the challenges related to two areas in the implementation of PPP in large projects: the 
role of contract renegotiations in improving risk sharing, and the impact of Monte Carlo Simulations (MCS) on 
investment appraisals. 
1.1 Research aim and objectives 
1.1.1 Aim of the paper 
The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of PPP procurements, their integration within large 
projects, and their contribution to green growth. It will also aid practitioners in recognizing the contractual 
challenges to improve the chances of PPP success in promoting green growth, especially in risk sharing and 
investment appraisals. Specifically, this paper is focusing on renegotiations and MCS, and their positive and 
negative impacts on the safe completion of PPP projects.  
The paper will provides overviews of the literature written in favour or against common practices related to 
contract renegotiations and the utilization of MCS in PPP projects, and analysing such literature to arrive at new 
findings for the improvement of handling of large green PPP projects. Finally, the findings will furnish the basis 
for relevant practices and future research that will focus on improving areas of interest in sustainable PPP that will 
improve the chances for a green growth. 
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1.1.2 Objectives  
In order to achieve the above aim, the following objectives were identified: 
• Highlight the benefits, barriers, and success factors for PPP contracts. 
• Highlight the importance of flexibility in PPP contracts, the need for renegotiations, and within what 
parameters. 
• Establish how MCS lead to improved investment appraisals, and what measures should be taken to improve the 
input of MCS. 
• Propose future work to improve the design of PPP contracts based on the findings of the report to improve the 
chances of green growth. 
1.2 Significance of the Study  
Governments around the globe have realized the worth of PPP contracts. Since PPP involve collaborations 
between public and private entities, this study focuses on how to maximise the mutual benefits from these projects 
while contributing to global green growth. 
While there are many studies on PPP projects, more are needed to investigate the challenges facing both parties 
in the contracts that hinder the maximization of potential with these projects. Moreover, since the awareness of 
sustainability is growing exponentially, the authors of this report are assuming that, under normal circumstances, 
governments will add clauses mandating green practices. Governments can impose these on new projects that are 
funded by the private sector through PPP without the financial burden due to the initial cost hike in green 
developments. Also, the international community is offering funds to encourage all countries to adopt a green 
growth strategy in the form of PPP. Therefore, green growth can be promoted by PPP. It is important to ensure that 
the positive outcomes of these collaborations are maximized to enable governments to realize these projects rather 
than endless disputes due to flawed contracts and misleading estimations. 
Therefore, this report highlights important areas related to the design of PPP contracts, and the impact of 
refining the design of contract on maximizing the benefits of PPP contracts. It also analyses the weaknesses in risk 
simulations that are used in investment appraisals. Both topics are vital to the success of PPP contracts in green 
developments, and this report argues that such success will improve the chances of green growth. 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology for conducting this report will be a literature appraisal of peer reviewed research papers that 
studied PPP contract designs, and the role of simulative approaches in real estate investment appraisals. The topics 
will be critically reviewed from various perspectives to provide depth of the characteristics of the studied topics, 
and a breadth of different research findings, all of which will be used to propose improvements for practitioners 
and areas to be focused on for future research. 
1.4 Report Structure 
The remaining sections of this report will be structured as follows: Section two will discuss the flexibility in 
PPP contracts to balance risk and rewards. Section three will discuss the implementation of Monte Carlo 
Simulation in real estate PPP investment appraisals. Finally, the conclusion section will summarize the full report 
with emphasis on future work to be done. 
2. Flexibility in PPP contracts to balance risk and rewards 
Privatization has become more prominent in the past few years in infrastructure projects. The reasons for this 
movement include the search for quality, efficiency, availability of funding, and risk transfer. In theory the PPP is a 
highly viable option for governments to procure projects and services, since the duties of both the public and 
private sectors are detailed for long-term engagement. However, in reality, this detailed scope changes with time, 
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warranting reconsideration of the agreements, or as termed “renegotiation” of the terms to adapt to the new 
conditions. 
2.1 Flexibility through renegotiation clauses 
Renegotiations are connected to risk allocation. The main attraction for governments to seek PPP is the 
assignment of risks to the concessionaire, who is thought to bear them, and can better manage them. This transfer 
reduces the economic burden related to such risks if handled by the public sector. However, most PPP contracts 
include clauses that protect the private sector from bearing these risks while maintaining a steady stream of 
economic benefits for the full duration of the contract. Risk allocation and its corresponding economic benefit 
clauses must be reconsidered to deal with any opportunistic intentions by the private sector, which is benefiting 
from unique projects while being shielded from most risks. Opportunistic tricks are very prevalent in PPP contracts 
because the awarding criteria is based on best assumptions of the return on investment and not necessarily on 
realistic criteria, since the private sector is responsible for being innovative in generating the maximum returns 
while maintaining a predefined level of service to the public. Therefore, pure generic contractual engagement is not 
sufficiently suitable for achieving the desired outcomes of PPP projects (Zhang, 2009; Athias, 2010; Rui and Cruz, 
2012). 
Partnerships between the public sector and private parties are supposed to be built on shared benefits rather than 
a binding contract. The public party has a limited ability to call off a deal when reaching an undesirable 
relationship with the private entities.  Conversely, the private parties can withdraw from any deal under various 
clauses related to variations and uncertainty. Therefore, shared understanding should persist throughout the 
duration of the contract alongside the durable clauses to maintain the public interest (Quiggin, 2005).  
PPP are long-term contracts. If the government keeps the contract as is, it will forgo many benefits such as new 
technologies or better and efficient competitors who can maximize the benefits and improve the services for the 
community. If governments alter the contract, it will warrant an opportunistic compensation scheme from the 
private party who is protected by well-defined clauses learned from previous experiences, since the private party is 
the one with the know how. Therefore, PPP contracts must allow a level of flexibility for public parties to amend 
any clauses that lead to the improvement of the services offered to the public, such as adapting to new trends in 
consumer behaviour due to evolutions over long periods of time (Zhang, 2009; Athias, 2010). Therefore, flexibility 
in including certain clauses in PPP contracts to offer a systematic approach for dealing with the situations when a 
party is interested in revisiting the scope and amending the clauses for the mutual benefit of both parties is 
recommended for the successful completion of the PPP contract. However, this flexibility must be balanced. Too 
flexible contracts will invite opportunistic behaviour, while less flexibility will lead to lost opportunities for 
improving public services (Athias, 2010). 
This flexibility comes in many forms, one of which is the incorporation of a renegotiation clause in the PPP 
contract. Renegotiations are opted for when the public sector seeks to balance the risks and economic benefits. 
Risks can be any unexpected losses or gains that go in favour of one party over the other. The private party also 
seeks renegotiations when risks are underestimated and more support from the government is desired. Therefore, 
the overall theme of a renegotiation clause, which is supposed to add flexibility to PPP contracts, is to balance risks 
and rewards between public and private parties while efficiently delivering the services to the public (Bracey and 
Moldovan, 2006).  
During the implementation phase of PPP contracts, unexpected events might require renegotiations to mitigate 
these risks to realign the goals of the project and balance the equities of risk sharing between public and private 
parties. Both parties acknowledge the importance of renegotiations, as the lack of, when eventualities arise, might 
result in the cancellation of the project if not renegotiated. Bracey and Moldovan (2006) reported that between 
1990 and 2003, the estimated percentage for renegotiated PPP is about 50%. 
The content of the renegotiation clause must be discussed during the negotiation stage of the contract. “The 
clause should first, specify what acceptable conditions would qualify either side to initiate renegotiation 
discussions and what the renegotiation process would look like, and what assistance would be used if an agreement 
could not be made” (Bracey and Moldovan, 2006).  
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However, paying attention to the details in the original contract and strengthening its clauses must be given the 
priority before deciding to include a loosely added clause for renegotiation that can be abused by both parties. 
Indeed, a renegotiation clause can lead to the failure of contracts. 
2.2 Avoiding renegotiation clause by improving the design of the contract 
Marques and Cruz (2012) argue that “Although the benefits of this kind of contract are widely acknowledged, 
renegotiation is a major contract failure that may jeopardize its value for money”. They explain that renegotiations 
are bilateral discussions to restore a previously accepted condition for both parties. Under such circumstances, the 
private party holds an advantage of having more information about the project; also, without other competitors, 
which were eliminated at the awarding stage, the private party will be in a position to dictate conditions to their 
advantage. Marques and Cruz (2012) further emphasized the failure of renegotiations in PPP contracts by citing 
Bajari et al. (2006), who showed empirically that opting for renegotiations leads to extra costs on consumers. 
These extra costs can be in the form of increased charges on users, or as governmental compensations to the 
operator; such variations to the original contract undermine the legitimacy of the awarding process. Marques and 
Cruz (2012) argue that if more time was given to collecting information and studying the situation before the 
awarding process, both parties to the contract will benefit, and the need for renegotiating the contract will be 
minimal. They stress that, since the chances of renegotiation are substantial, improving the design of PPP contracts 
are recommended strongly, and they must include detailed analysis of how such incidents are mitigated. Otherwise, 
as Marques and Cruz (2012) argue, disputes will lead to a deadlock prompting an early termination of the contract 
by opting for the call option, which in their opinion if included “is very harmful for the public party, since it has to 
pay a disproportionate compensation to the private partner.” 
2.3 Flexibility through put and call options 
Quiggin (2005) concurs with Marques and Cruz (2012) in the call for improving the design of PPP contracts to 
minimize the need for renegotiations; however, he advocates the inclusion of put and call options, and opposes 
their suggestion that such clauses are very harmful for the public interest, and stresses that such clauses will 
actually benefit more the public party. 
In long-term contracts such as the PPP, governments forgo any benefits arising from the entry of new competent 
private parties, who possess newer technologies and have better experiences during the long durations of these 
contracts. Governments also lose any opportunities to alter terms of the contract when they deem them necessary to 
meet changing needs and circumstances, except when opting for renegotiating such terms with the private partner. 
Quiggin (2005) suggests that governments should not engage in such long-term contracts unless they can predict in 
detail the way the contracted services will be operated in 20-30 years from now. The author suggests adding 
flexibility to PPP contracts through the inclusion of put and call options that can be opted for at elective intervals 
of, for example, five or ten years.  
Either party through the use of such options has the ability to terminate the contract at the specified intervals, 
where the private parties will receive lump sum compensations calculated from the flows of payments remaining in 
the contract. In a put and call contract, it is expected that the price for the government to call the contract is more 
than if the private parties choose to put. A call option allows the government to purchase the equity of the private 
parties, whereas a put option allows the private parties to purchase equities on pre-agreed prices and payment terms 
(Quiggin, 2005). Quiggin (2005) stresses that the use of put and call options can add transparency and improve the 
risk allocation of PPP contracts because both parties will be protected from any substantial losses arising from 
contract disputes. Under the current contracts, as the author added, a disagreement related to the range of pricing 
can only be solved by litigation, an issue that is easily dealt with in the put and call options. The private party can 
also walk away from any contract with limited damages covered by insurances and performance bonds, 
minimizing its losses from unsatisfactory projects. In this case, the public interest is not protected. Furthermore, in 
a put and call option, the public party is more protected than the private one and, presumably, this protection will 
reduce the incidents of the private party walking away from the contract. 
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More importantly, Quiggin (2005) states that put and call options would help deal with issues associated with 
long-term contracts. The need for variations in the scope and renegotiations, in light of changing needs and 
circumstances over time, will be automatically dealt with in put and call options. Most contract variations arise 
from the public partner, and the bargaining seems always to be in favour of the private one, and through 
acknowledging plausible threats for both parties, put and call options will enhance the mutual benefit from any 
bargaining related to variations.  
The majority of concerns related to PPP contracts in recent studies were focused on the area of improving risk 
allocation, since risks in such contracts are poorly specified, especially when they are related to public party’s 
variations. Quiggin (2005) concluded his argument by stressing that “The inclusion of put and call options in PPP 
contracts would impose bounds on the risk associated with unpredictable revenue streams, while maintaining the 
positive incentive effects associated with competitive contracting.” 
2.4 Recommendations 
Contract design for PPP projects is a complicated process that involves serious challenges to satisfy both 
contracting parties. Flexibility is likely to attract opportunistic behaviour, while rigidity is likely to make 
governments forgo any opportunities to improve the outcomes and modify the requirements according to demand 
change. 
Therefore, the signing parties of PPP contracts have to select between a flexible contract that, as detailed earlier, 
is not to the advantage of the public party, and a rigid contract that has a high probability of being renegotiated 
anyway, although no clauses for such renegotiations are present. A discussion of both options was detailed earlier 
in this section. The third option was the put and call options. 
Since most renegotiations after the signing of contracts are related to sharing the financial benefits of projects, 
the price uncertainty is the main concern to all parties and must be the focus of any proposed solution. 
Based on the argument presented in this section related to the design of PPP contracts, the authors of the report 
propose a hybrid contract to include all options discussed. The proposed model will require that ample time be 
given to designing unique contracts according to the type and complexity of the project. All clauses in the contract 
must be fully detailed and checked for completeness and accuracy, as if this contract will be a rigid one. Once 
completed, a put and call option will be added for renegotiations of financial terms based only on specified 
conditions and parameters, such as a drop in consumption by more than 15%. The put and call option should be 
activated on specified intervals such as five or ten years. Finally, a detailed renegotiation clause can be added to 
cover specific events with predefined measures and parameters for amendments and compensations. 
3. The effectiveness of Monte Carlo Simulation in real estate PPP investment appraisals 
This section will discuss investment appraisals in sustainable large-scale projects. The emphasis will be on the 
assessment of risk that is applied to the evaluation of real estate investments because buildings are the primary 
consumers of energy; therefore green buildings will have a significant impact on the economy and the environment 
(Newsham et al., 2009).  
A methodology called Monte Carlo Simulation is one of the techniques widely used in assessing risk for 
appraising investments. Large-scale projects are generally evaluated on net present value (NPV) calculations. The 
NPV, which is the net value of future cash inflows and outflows, provides the decision maker with the option to 
accept or reject the investment based on a final figure; it is supposed to be positive to accept the investment. The 
NPV is also used to rank which investments to start with in portfolio management based on the highest positive 
NPV. The generic NPV model employs a sensitivity test to deal with risks related to input variables, such as rent, 
interest rates, market demands, project complexity, unforeseen site conditions, phase concurrent completions, and 
fuel prices. However, this sensitivity test is static and linear in nature. The Monte Carlo method improves 
significantly the robustness of the investment appraisal as it provides scenarios for risk assessment created from 
probability distributions from the input variables. But, there is more to be done to improve the contribution of 
MCS to the investment appraisal of the sustainable developments. The input variables in the sustainable 
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development investments are dynamic in nature, and will require more than simply employing a simulation 
method; rather, it requires an effective utilization of such simulations. 
3.1 Review of the literature 
Project managers realized that identifying, analysing, and assessing possible risks associated with their projects 
enabled them to prepare the appropriate contingency plans to mitigate these risks. Such preparations help project 
managers to better deal with unexpected situations that occur during the contract duration, and so improve the 
likelihood of successful completion of their projects. 
One of the methods used for the analysis of risks during the initial stages of projects is called MCS, which is an 
application that is used to simulate various mathematical and scientific scenarios from input variables to predict 
potential outcomes of projects. MCS is widely used in research and commercial practice, as well as the appraisal of 
securities and residential investments. Simulations related to risk analysis have been particularly used for 
developing scenarios for investment decisions (Pfnür and Armonat, 2013). The use of the method dates back to 
World War II and is credited to the US mathematician Stanislaw Ulam. His work with Nicholas Metropolis 
transformed the statistical sampling to a more formal approach that extended the application to a broader area of 
project problems. Metropolis named the methodology after the casinos of Monte Carlo, since the methodology 
represents a gambling situation in calculating probabilities. MCS is mostly associated with risk quantification; it 
enables project managers to allocate schedule and budget reserves to deal with eventualities that could have 
adverse effects on the success of the project (Kwak a and  Ingall, 2007).
Pfnür and Armonat (2013) stated that, since the early 1970s, the simulative risk analysis have been widely used 
in the decision-making process of the appraisal of the investments. They cited the work of Phyrr (1973) and 
MacFarlane (1995) who provided good introductions and practical examples, and was followed by the work of 
Jackson (2009) who provided, through this method, criteria for appraising sustainable real estate investments. 
Pfnür and Armonat (2013) further cited the work of van der Spek and Horenmann (2011) that introduced the 
utilization of MCS in financial decision making such as in the optimal loan to value ratio, and the work of Cheng 
et al. (1999) who investigated the return on foreign real estate investments by using the MCS, and the work of 
Johnson et al. (2006) who utilized MCS in investigating currency risks. Brown and Schuck (1996) and Pfnur 
(2011) investigated the application of the MCS method in portfolio management decision-making process under 
risk uncertainty.  
MCS in the project management discipline is mostly used in areas related to time and cost management, where 
quantification of risk levels that can impact the budget or completion time of projects is calculated.  
In time management, MCS is used to predict the confidence the managers should have in the milestones set for 
the completion of an activity or a set of activities. First, the managers assign a probability distribution function to 
the tasks in order to get a better estimation. Then a three-point estimate supplied by the experts is used to estimate 
the duration of a task or a group of interrelated tasks; optimistic, normal, and pessimistic. Then, the project 
managers can fit the three estimates for the tasks to a duration probability distribution such as normal, Beta, or 
triangular distribution. Once the simulation is completed, the project manager will be able to predict the 
completion of a task or set of tasks on a particular date, allowing him to set a schedule reserve for the project. Such 
scope can be handled by different project management software, such as Primavera or MS Project, along with the 
add-inns for MCS such as Risk+ (Kwak and  Ingall, 2007). 
In cost management, project managers use MCS to better predict the final cost of projects at completion. In this 
case, the managers assign probability distribution to costs of tasks rather that its durations. Normally, experienced 
project estimators produce the costs and the final Monte Carlo calculations are for the overall project cost 
estimation. Project managers use this distribution to allocate reserves in project budgets to support contingency 
plans for responding to any events (Kwak and  Ingall, 2007). 
MCS can also be used in other areas of project management such as program and portfolio management when 
making strategic investment decisions. Kwak and Ingall (2007) cited Smith (1994) who outlined how simulations 
can assist managers to choose between different investment alternatives. Smith (1994) explained that, instead of 
using the net cash flow estimates for each year of a single value, managers can use a distribution of possible NPV 
854   Khalid Almarri and Paul Blackwell /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  119 ( 2014 )  847 – 856 
of an investment. This is particularly important when choosing between different capital investments that might 
have similar NPV means but different levels of NPV distribution. 
3.2 Discussion   
The utilization of MCS in real estate investment appraisals has not gained much momentum over the past 
decade (Loizou and French, 2012). The type of the method that is widely used in real estate appraisals generally 
reflects a linear relationship of cash flows to uncertainty over a period of time. This linear trend is not 
representative of the reality of many factors such as rent, interest rates, and market demands, which are dynamic in 
nature, and therefore not adding value for the appraisal.  
The primary advantage of MCS is that it is an effective tool when attempting to quantify and understand the 
effects of unexpected events of the project. Monte Carlo allows managers to quantify risk effects, which enables 
them to adjust their budgets accordingly, and to prepare the respective contingency plans to deal with uncertainties 
during the project lifespan. But, this powerful function is highly dependent on the quality of the input information 
used for the calculations that are taken from previously completed real estate investments, and the experience of 
the estimator. 
Generally, a real estate PPP investment is secured on the cash inflow side. However, the small periodic 
surpluses from real estate PPP long-term investments and the long pay back periods for borrowed capital lead to a 
high risk if the future returns on the investment turn out to be overestimated (Pfnür and Armonat, 2013). This 
uncertainty in future trends in real estate developments poses a serious threat to investing in this industry. The 
appraisal process is the best tool for forecasting the risks and opportunities for returns on the investment, and the 
credibility of such appraisals is deterring some of the prospective investors from investing in these relatively 
secured real estate investments. Empirical studies demonstrated that there was considerable inaccuracy in forecasts 
made by the developers in relation to real estate revenues and expenses. Pfnür and Armonat (2013) reported that 
“according to European decision makers’ own assessments, over a 10-year period there was an average 
discrepancy of 47% between the forecast rental income and that actually realized.” This discrepancy is due, for the 
most part, to the developers who have employed static single point appraisal models for their investments, and 
added the uncertainties that are associated with the investments through sensitivity studies based on previous 
projects that they thought would be sufficient. Real estate development appraisal models are very sensitive by 
nature to any variations to the inputs. Any small changes in the input variables, such as rent, time, interest rate, can 
drastically impact the value or profit (Loizou and French, 2012).  
3.2.1 Uncertainty related to the type of information used as inputs 
The uncertainty in the context of development in general is the product of the lack of knowledge or 
insufficiency of information about the input variables required for conducting the analysis. If the reliability of the 
input variables cannot be confirmed, then the outcomes will be uncertain. However, if it is possible to assign 
probabilities to the input variables, then a range of possible outcomes can be determined that will be a 
measurement of risk (Loizou and French, 2012). The real estate development and constructions in general are 
complex systems of activities, and attempting to identify risks for simulation must be done with extreme care. Real 
estate developments must be looked at as a system of distinct, yet interrelated, parts that are not linear and have the 
probability of producing risk (Loizou and French, 2012). 
The scope for the real estate development consists of relationships that the developer must coordinate and 
manage to achieve the milestones of different stages, and consequently the completion of the project. Each stage 
carries unique risks that are transferable to other stages. Each activity’s completion typically determines the 
starting of the next one. Therefore, the relationship of all variables, especially the ones related to a set of activities, 
to uncertainty over a period of time is not linear and not sufficient in the type of real estate development where 
constant modifications to an activity or a set of activities are required throughout the duration of the contract to put 
the project on track (Loizou and French, 2012).  
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3.2.2 Uncertainty related to the quality of input information 
The uncertainty related to the quality of information used as inputs of the appraisal of real estate developments 
yields recurrent deficiency in the outcomes of such appraisals. This is due, for the most part, to the knowledge and 
experience of the estimator who is providing the approximate unit rate of the items that are used as inputs in any 
estimation process. The contingencies applied to the base item rate are dependent on the judgment of the estimator, 
and they include issues such as scope variations, unforeseen site circumstances, change of regulations, default of 
financier, and high-risk tasks. Risk-based estimations have been found to be vital to the final appraisal of 
development investments as they communicate close to reality item cost figures in the very early planning stages 
of projects, and therefore prompt a better informed decision-making process (Loizou and French, 2012).  
Other reasons for the inaccuracy of input items include loosely defined scopes, as the scope is less detailed and 
the resources are scarce at the early stages of planning of projects. In addition to the lack of item rate and risk 
charters that are extremely effective in defining initial project costs. Cost charters include lists of various items 
drawn from bill of quantities of a wide range of projects and industries. The cost charters might also include item 
cost for parametric and volumetric estimations, which are very efficient in estimating a scope rather than an item, 
such as cost per length. And risk charters include lists of identified risks, their impact on the projects, and the 
contingency plans that are most successful in mitigating them. 
3.3 Current practice and recommendation for improvement 
Most cost estimations related to real estate developments, and constructions in general, depend on historical 
data to establish the base price of each item that goes into any calculation method to produce a final figure for the 
development. Once all activities are estimated and the relationships are established, a critical path method is 
applied to link all activities and stages of the development. Once the shortest path to completion is established, a 
final cost is generated and a percentage based on previous experiences is added as a contingency to cover all risks, 
yielding the final cost of the project. This linear approach does not benefit from simulation techniques that can 
generate probabilities for all types of risk to predict a realistic cost within plausible ranges. MCS will not only, if 
applied, produce scenarios of possible events and their related costs, but also will allow the developers to recognize 
possible events in the very early stages of the project and respond to them more accurately. 
But, the application of MCS is not necessarily an indication that the final cost estimation for the development 
appraisal is a good one. The information and knowledge used in the estimation process of cost are the same input 
variables that go into the calculations of the MCS. In other words, if the data used for the cost estimation is not 
sufficient, the same will apply to the MCS. 
The MCS accuracy level can benefit significantly from using highly qualified estimators, in addition to unifying 
the mechanisms and models used in estimating the input variables. Local departments and municipalities should 
create a repository of bills of quantities of various types of projects with different categories according to 
engineering complexity. Such information supplemented by the types of contingencies encountered, the 
completion times, cost variations, environmental and safety impacts, and unforeseen circumstances, among other 
types of information, will enable the estimators to predict and model the most realistic cost of the project; this in 
turn will prompt a well informed investment decision-making process. The municipalities can standardize a model 
for establishing the detailed cost of any type of construction that includes simulations to cover all expected 
contingencies based on the information gathered from all projects constructed within their jurisdiction. Such 
models can be merged with other models generated by other municipalities to ensure generalizability of the 
techniques used locally. This will undoubtedly improve the input information used for the simulation of risks that 
can be added to the base item rate, which in turn will improve the quality of real estate development investments 
appraisals. 
Conclusion 
Governments have a great leverage on how green any investments can be while enjoying steady revenues and 
good services for the public. This study focused on improving the chances of success with PPP contracts, since 
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more successful projects will lead to an improved welfare, and will improve the chances for greening the 
community. 
The first improvement recommended was to reconsider the design of PPP contracts to allow for a level of 
flexibility to survive contingencies. The option of a renegotiation clause appeared to be effective in guarding the 
interest of both parties, and the public’s, for the duration of the contract. A hybrid contract of specific renegotiation 
clauses and put and call options was suggested by the authors of this report for practitioners to overcome the kind 
of disputes that arise in the type of PPP contracts, which are characterised as being long and complex. 
The second improvement was recommended to cater for the pitfalls surrounding the investment appraisal 
process in PPP projects. MCS was introduced as one of the most effective models in simulating risks for the final 
cost of projects. MCS is underappreciated in real estate developments because it is not effective in the way it is 
used in producing more accurate appraisals. This report emphasised the dynamic nature of the input variables that 
must be considered in order for the outcomes to be closer to reality. The quality of such inputs can be improved, 
and the type of information can be detailed more precisely. Finally, charters for all costs and risks and how to 
handle them before and after the commencement of contracts were recommended. 
The implication of this report for practice is that governments and developers must ensure the right flexibility 
balance in the design of PPP contracts. Another implication for practice is the emphasis for the proper utilization of 
MCS in real estate investment appraisals. Once the developers use the proper information for risk simulation, a 
better appraisal will be produced for the decision makers to make a well-informed decision that is in the best 
interest of their portfolios. The implications of this report for researchers lie in the identification of new areas in 
contract design that improve the chances of success of PPP projects. The suggested hybrid contract can be the 
focus of future researchers, which can be implemented in various projects, and a study of its outcomes can be 
quantitatively analysed to establish the significance of its success. 
Finally, the quantification of the input variables used for cost estimations and risk simulations is another 
implication for research. The identification of the required information, and the quality of extracting it, is essential 
for the outcomes to be realistic. It is also important to establish constructs that are related to a collective set of 
tasks, rather that only individual ones, to suit the type of risks associated with the construction industry. 
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